Despite evidence to the contrary, there continue to be doubts amongst those in the commercial space industry about the military’s willingness to adopt commercial technology in space.
This doubt is discussed in a recent article in Space News. The article contains numerous quotes from industry executives concerned that entrenched procurement habits hinder the integration of next-generation commercial capabilities while near-peer adversaries race ahead.
I believe these doubts are short-sighted. Yes, it’s hard to turn a battleship overnight. However, based on my experience, the DoD has accepted the benefits of incorporating commercial technology, such as increased innovation and cost-effectiveness. In 2010 as the MILSATCOM Advanced Concepts Group Commander, I was repeatedly told that warfighters were not ready to accept the disaggregation of protected SATCOM into strategic and tactical systems.
And yet today, we have a clear delineation between strategic SATCOM on AEHF and future Enhanced Strategic SATCOM systems and the emerging Protected Tactical Service. Similarly, we brought about a seismic change in commercial SATCOM as a capability of last resort for warfighters to an integrated crucial partner nearing equal stature with some purpose-built USG systems.
This acceptance can be seen in developments like the Proliferated Low-Earth-Orbit (PLEO) contract. It can also be seen in the adoption of different approaches to using commercial activity – such as government-owned, contractor-operated (GoCo).
SpaceX’s Starshield is an example of the GoCo model, in which the government is purchasing satellites that are then operated by the contractor. The Space Development Agency (SDA) is purchasing commercial technology to build its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), which will operate in a government-owned, government-operated (GoGo) model. The embrace of these different models is an indication that commercial technology has a permanent place in military space planning.
Moving Forward – Rethinking Inherently Government Functions
The Defense Science Board (DSB) recently released a report on military space that suggested some steps forward. The DSB report acknowledges that the current definition of “inherently governmental” functions in space is overly broad, has hindered the adoption of commercial technology, and needs to be redefined.
The DBS Report and the commercial space industry agree that the DoD should take immediate action to redefine inherently government functions in space – determining what the Government needs to retain full ownership of versus what commercial technology can deliver better, faster, and more economically.
This aligns with General Saltzman’s, the Chief of Space Operations, “exploit, build and buy” strategy in space. As related to commercial capabilities, the government should exploit existing commercial space technology wherever and whenever possible. Next, it should buy readily available commercial capabilities and, finally, only build custom military space systems when absolutely necessary.
The report also attempts to organize commercial space into specific elements. However, the pace of commercial innovation has exceeded some of the categorical definitions. The ability of Telesat to provide flexible capacity pools and allow defense customers to act as their own virtual network operator is an example.
The DoD could purchase a regional or global capacity pool from Telesat with guaranteed service level agreements (SLAs). They could maintain complete control over how the capacity is “sliced and diced” to each site in their network, prioritizing data as they see fit using Class of Service (CoS) controls, such as priorities defined in the existing CJCSI 6250. The DoD could use any of the procurement models listed above and use the Telesat Lightspeed network to dynamically bring multi-Gbps of data to a single “Hot Spot.”
A Stronger Cybersecurity Partnership in Space
Another example of increased public/private collaboration in space is the DoD sharing cybersecurity guidance with the private sector. Central to the U.S. Space Force’s efforts in this area is developing the Infrastructure Asset Pre-Approval Program, or IA-Pre. IA-Pre is an objective cybersecurity risk assessment process for self-nominated COMSATCOM assets measured against National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) controls/enhancements.
IA-Pre contains 477 cybersecurity controls, aligned with the NIST 800-53 High-Impact level. This is far more than the 55 in the legacy security framework known as the CSCO Information Assurance Questionnaire (CIAQ).
Meeting these stringent cybersecurity requirements requires investing time and money by commercial satellite providers. For example, Telesat is investing in IA-Pre controls to achieve a low-risk classification for its Telesat Lightspeed LEO network and offering security capabilities such as jam resistance and low probability of intercept.
Many commercial space operators are willing to invest in stronger cybersecurity. However, another step towards a better partnership in space would be for the government to follow through with preferential scoring for these features on the source selection/procurement side. This has not been the standard practice for COMSATCOM acquisition.
Last year, the SATCOM Industry Group (SIG) called on the DoD to implement the following to demonstrate its commitment to commercial space technology that improves cybersecurity in space:
- Establish a hard-cutoff date for the CIAQ and other non-IA-PRE processes to facilitate the transition to the IA-Pre model
- Publish objective and transparent assessment methodology and scoring of the specific controls relative to residual risk for commercial operators making investment decisions
- Data Protection – the Space Force USSF should consider the data provided in the IA-Pre Database as proprietary information of the asset owner and will not be released by any party except by the asset owner under the provisions of a Non-Disclosure Agreement
- Agency of Security Control Assessors (ASCAs) – If such non-governmental personnel are used to evaluate IA-Pre compliance, clear personal and organizational conflict of interest safeguards should be established and enforced. Also, the cost of assessment needs to be clarified transparently.
Geopolitical realities have made a stronger commercial/government space partnership necessary. The conflict in Ukraine and tensions in Asia have demonstrated how important proliferated satellite architectures have become in ensuring resilient, assured connectivity for missions worldwide.
Institutional biases and inertia don’t change overnight, but there are clear indications that new ways of deploying commercial technology in government constellations are being implemented. Working together, we can fully leverage commercial innovation in space to keep the U.S. and Allied nations secure.
